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ANALYSIS OF AUTOMATIC JUDGMENTS OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF 
 
 
The measurement of religious belief has some social desirability concerns that make 
the development of an implicit measure of religiosity advantageous. Currently, there are few 
options for implicitly measuring religious belief. This study attempted to add to this 
literature by analyzing the automatic judgements of religious belief through the use of an 
implicit measure known as the MouseTrack task, allowing for the measurement of latency in 
the expression of these beliefs as well as the certainty of these beliefs by tracking the path 
taken during the decision process. A sample of 121 undergraduates was recruited from the 
UK SONA subject pool. Desired religious variance was not achieved in the sample, making 
interpretation of results difficult. Detailed breakdowns of these path analyses are given. Key 
trends in findings are discussed. 
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ANALYSIS OF AUTOMATIC JUDGMENTS OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF 
 
 
“Seldom, very seldom, does complete truth belong to any human disclosure; 
seldom can it happen that something is not a little disguised, or a little mistaken.” 
― Jane Austen, Emma 
 
 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Religion has been the cornerstone of much of human experience. Much of ancient 
and modern human history has been shaped by religious belief. From the building of 
extraordinary monuments like the Pyramids of Giza, to the divine right of kings, to the 
dates marked as holidays on calendars, religion has played a fundamental role in human 
culture and history. In America, this emphasis on religion has remained steadfast, with a 
majority of people saying that religion is very important in their daily lives (Pew, 2015). 
Though religious belief is still widespread and important among Americans, religious belief 
has been on the decline in recent decades. 
 
Decreasing Religious Belief 
According to Pew Research Center, the number of people who identify as Christian 
is declining, while the number who do not consider themselves part of any organized 
religion is increasing (Pew, 2015). Additionally, the number of individuals who identify as 
“None” on religious identification questions is rapidly increasing; this includes those who 
identify as atheists, agnostics, or simply as having no religious belief (Pew, 2012). In terms of 
actual numbers, representative telephone polls yield an estimate of 3% explicitly identifying 
with the term “atheist” (Pew, 2015) and 11% saying they don’t believe in God (Gallup, 2015). 
 2 
These numbers are even higher when examining indirectly measured belief in 
addition to self-reported belief. In a recent study, Gervais and Najle (2018) measured 
religious disbelief indirectly and compared this to self-reports. To achieve this indirect 
measure, they gave participants a list of statements and asked to count how many of these 
statements described them. Participants in the baseline condition received a list of generic 
descriptors, while participants in the indirect condition received the same list plus an item 
about not believing in a god. In both conditions, participants gave a total count of the 
number of statements that were true of them. By comparing the tallies from these two lists, 
identical save for the socially sensitive item about religious disbelief, the difference, on 
average, was attributable to the additional item. Using this difference, the researchers were 
able to compare the indirectly measured religious disbelief to a self-report from another 
condition. In two nationally representative samples (Ntotal = 4000), they found that levels of 
disbelief were closer to 25% (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. From Gervais and Najle (2018). Proportions of relgious disbelief from self-reports 
(light gray) and indirectly measure religious disbelief (light gray). Higher values on a given 
curve indicate more likely values.  
 
Explaining the Rise 
Though the reasons for this decline in religious belief are unclear, several theories 
offer possible explanations. According to the thesis of secularization based on existential 
security, two main components contribute to levels of religious belief: security and cultural 
traditions (Norris & Inglehart, 2011). Security in this case can mean a number of different 
things, including, but not limited to: environmental degradation, largescale disasters 
(natural or manmade), disease or threat of disease, human rights violations, and 
socioeconomic inequality and poverty. Norris and Inglehart (2011) posit that changes in 
religious belief would be seen soonest in affluent societies with well-developed social safety 
nets and welfare, such as Sweden, the Netherlands, and France. Worldwide, the countries 
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with highest levels of state welfare spending fall in line with this prediction, with generally 
lower levels of religiosity (Gill & Lundsgaarde, 2004; Zuckerman, 2007). 
The social purposes that religious institutions and leaders would perform 
traditionally are replaced by the secular institutions. This [component] of the thesis 
emphasizes the functional role of religious belief, as a stabilizing force that offers cohesion 
and order. Roes and Raymond (2003) support this claim, highlighting the cohesive influence 
of moralizing gods especially in allowing large scale societies to form and grow. As society 
size increases, belief in moralizing gods increases as well—to a point (see Figure 2). Once 
societies reach a certain size, the increasing trend in belief reverses, with lower levels of 
belief in the largest of societies. This trend is consistent with a functional explanation of 
religious, with moralizing gods allowing for larger scale cooperation than would be 
unachievable otherwise (Norenzayan, 2013; Norenzayan & Gervais, 2012a; Norenzayan & 
Shariff, 2008; Norenzayan et al., 2016; Norenzayan et al., 2014) and then tapering off when 
secular sources of stability emerge. 
 
 
Figure 2. Belief in moralizing Gods and society size. From Roes & Raymond (2003). Original 
Caption: "Society size and belief in moralising gods. The size of a society is estimated by the 
jurisdictional hierarchy beyond the local community, from 1 (no levels, i.e., no political 
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authority beyond community) to 5 (four levels, e.g., large states). Data from the 1990 edition 
of the Ethnographic Atlas. A similar shape found with the EA 1967, EA 1999 and the SCCS." 
 
This relationship between stability and religious faith is bidirectional, with 
decreases in perceived stability yielding increases in religious belief. Kay, Shepherd, Blatz, 
Chua, and Galinsky (2010) show this hydraulic relationship in both longitudinal and 
experimentally controlled studies. Their findings highlight the functional role religion and 
government play in compensatory control when individuals feel they lack personal control. 
God and government help individuals “see the world as orderly and nonrandom” (Kay et al., 
2010, p. 729). Decreased feelings of personal control can be compensated for by placing trust 
in the government if the government is seen as stable and able to offer this support. When 
trust in the government decreases and perceptions of government instability rise (e.g., after 
a tumultuous election, as in the longitudinal study in the paper), this sense of control 
decreases, and belief in a controlling god increases. Likewise, perceptions of increased 
political stability led to weaker beliefs in a controlling god. The 2011 earthquake that hit 
Christchurch, New Zealand offered further support for this in a quasi-experimental design. 
Researchers collecting longitudinal data before and after the disaster were able to track 
changes in religious belief based on how much participants were affected by the earthquake 
(Sibley & Bulbulia, 2012). They found that while some lost faith after the disaster, the net 
effect was an increase in religious belief, especially for those personally affected by the 
quake. 
As global economic and political stability increase, this relationship between god 
and government control helps, in part, explain the decrease in religious belief observed over 
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time. Another factor playing into this decrease is the second axiom in the thesis of 
secularization: cultural traditions (Norris & Inglehart, 2011). Religious belief (or lack 
thereof) is acquired largely through cultural transmission (Gervais & Najle, 2015; e.g., 
Gervais, Willard, Norenzayan, & Henrich, 2011; Norenzayan & Gervais, 2012b) and depends 
strongly on the kind and levels of credibility enhancing displays (CREDs, see Henrich, 
2009). CREDs for religious belief vary widely and can include such things as attending 
religious services, following religious rules (e.g., following Kosher diet) , praying regularly 
and visibly (e.g., before a meal as opposed to silently and alone before bed), and costly 
religious rituals (e.g., fasting during Ramadan; see Henrich, 2009, for more). CREDs are key 
to religious beliefs being passed on, and when these displays of belief are lacking, the beliefs 
can fail to be passed on. 
Qualitative research exploring this topic suggests that this development of religious 
disbelief based on a lack of CREDs takes place over a two generation span (Lanman, 2012). 
Stability occurs during or before the first generation, which experiences sufficient CREDs 
needed to develop religious belief. Their stability and security leads to less of a focus on the 
practice of religion. Despite having strong faith and religious belief, this shift leads to fewer 
CREDs regarding this belief when raising the next generation. Due to the decrease in 
CREDs, the next generation is less likely to develop these beliefs than the previous 
generation. The key is not the religious belief of the individuals surrounding the next 
generation, but the amount this belief is displayed in a meaningful way such as to lead to the 
transmission of these beliefs. This, in turn, leads to a generation without faith who does not 
display any CREDs for religious belief to the next generation, and thus the cultural 
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transmission of religious traditions becomes a cultural transmission of a lack of religious 
traditions, such as is seen in Scandinavian countries (Lanman, 2012; Zuckerman, 2007).  
Despite the increase in religious disbelief globally and even within the United States, 
levels of religious belief are frequently over reported when using conventional self-report 
measures (Presser & Stinson, 1998). These theories and findings help explain why religious 
belief has decreased over time, but they do not explain why a discrepancy exists between 
religious self-reports and beliefs and practices.  
 
An Issue of Measurement 
In countries that have religious majorities, such as the United States, there is 
considerable pressure to over report religious belief and practices (e.g., Cox, Jones, & 
Navarro-Rivera, 2014; Hadaway, Marler, & Chaves, 1993; Presser & Stinson, 1998; Sedikides 
& Gebauer, 2009). This is the case for church attendance both from churches’ reports of 
their congregations, and even more so the case for congregants’ self-reports of weekly church 
attendance (Brenner, 2011; Hadaway et al., 1993; Hadaway, Marler, & Chaves, 1998). When 
attendance at churches was independently investigated, actual attendance was half the 
reported numbers from Gallup polls of self-reported attendance (Hadaway & Marler, 2005). 
With reporting of self-reported religious belief, a similar trend is observed. For 
instance, the differences seen in the reports of religious disbelief vary a great deal. The 
difference between Pew (3%), Gallup (11%) and indirect measurement (26%) may in part be 
due to social desirability concerns. For starters, the methods used in each can affect the 
estimates obtained. Pew and Gallup polling rely on phone interviews, whereas estimates 
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measured through online surveys such as those in Gervais and Najle (2018) yielded higher 
rates. The increased anonymity afforded by internet polls may lead to participants being 
more comfortable self-disclosing religious disbelief. Wording can also influence socially 
desirable responding. Pew’s estimate is for those who self-report identifying with the term 
“atheist,” whereas Gallup’s estimate is based on those who self-disclose that they “don’t 
believe in God.” This subtle difference, largely a semantic one, results in a jump into double 
digits. This same wording asked in an online survey instead of over the phone takes the 
estimate from 11% to around 17% (self-report condition, Gervais & Najle, 2018). Using the 
same wording online and allowing participants to indirectly report their religious disbelief 
leads to an increase from 17% to about 26% (indirect condition, Gervais & Najle, 2018). Thus, 
when it comes to religious belief and disbelief, the specifics of the methods can influence the 
estimates a great deal and it is not as simple as simply asking what or whether people 
believe. 
 
Morality and Religion 
If religious belief is on the decline overall, what accounts for the gap in self-reports 
and actual religious behaviors and beliefs? What motivates people to over report their 
religiosity, even in an anonymous and online polls? The answer seems to lie in the overlap in 
perceptions of religiosity and morality. Religion is seen as being a source for morality and 
values (e.g., Bloom, 2012). As previously discussed, moralizing gods may have played an 
integral role in facilitating cooperation even among strangers in increasingly larger societies 
(Roes & Raymond, 2003). As society size increases, reputations become harder to track, and 
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thus social loafing and cheating becomes harder to monitor and punish. With a shared 
moralizing god, reputational concerns are seen as being kept in check by this supernatural 
overseer, allowing for cooperation beyond the limits of smaller societies. Key to this effect is 
the perceived influence of the supernatural agent over the individuals’ behaviors. Even belief 
in a different god or sect can be an indicator of trustworthiness over someone who does not 
believe in a god (Atran, 2004). Experimentally, being observed or even feelings of being 
watched have been shown to positively influence behavior by decreasing cheating and 
increasing honesty and prosocial behavior (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012; Haley & Fessler, 
2005; McKay, Efferson, Whitehouse, & Fehr, 2011; Piazza, Bering, & Ingram, 2011; Shariff & 
Norenzayan, 2007), thus suggesting that someone who does not believe in a god and who 
considers themselves outside of the purview of a supernatural watcher may be seen as less 
trustworthy. Religious belief, in turn, is seen as a direct indicator of trustworthiness (Tan & 
Vogel, 2008), and religious beliefs are used to signal trustworthiness (Clifford & Gaskins, 
2016). 
Those who lack religious belief are perceived quite negatively (e.g., Edgell, Gerteis, & 
Hartmann, 2006; Gervais, 2014; Gervais, Shariff, & Norenzayan, 2011). Atheism is associated 
with a wide range of moral violations, including minor moral transgressions like habitual 
lying and cheating at cards, as well as heinous acts such as cannibalism, animal abuse, and 
serial murder. Even acts that aren’t strictly immoral in a traditional sense but are still 
considered wrong by most, such as necrobestiality and consensual incest, are seen as being 
representative of atheists because of their lack of belief in a god or gods (Gervais, 2014). This 
perception of atheists as being inherently untrustworthy seems to rely on the notion that 
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morality comes from religious moral foundation, as  atheists aren’t perceived as 
intentionally being “evil” or immoral, but rather that they lack moral knowledge because of 
their lack of religious sources of morality (Najle & Gervais, unpublished data). 
Atheism is a concealable identity. Therefore, in societies such as the United States 
where lack of theistic belief is seen as an indicator of untrustworthiness, it makes sense that 
atheists would be hesitant to disclose their lack of belief and why religious belief and 
practices are over reported across the board. One option to circumvent the issues of socially 
desirable responding in measuring religious beliefs is to use an implicit measure. 
 
Measuring Implicit Belief 
Implicit measures have been developed for a wide range of attitudes and beliefs that 
are subject to concerns of social desirability. Given the social pressures to over-report 
religious belief to appear more moral, developing an implicit measure of religiosity could 
prove useful when more straightforward methods are unavailable or disadvantageous.  
Defining Elements of Implicit Attitudes 
Attitude formation can occur in a number of ways, most of which are unconscious. 
An attitude may develop through mere exposure, such as having repeated exposure to a 
stimulus (e.g., Zajonc, 1968, 2001). Attitude formation can also happen through evaluative 
conditioning such as having an object or concept repeatedly paired with an object or 
concept already familiar to the individual that already has a valence associated with it (De 
Houwer, Thomas, & Baeyens, 2001; Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 
2010; Hollands, Prestwich, & Marteau, 2011). In either case, these attitudes can be measured 
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either explicitly or implicitly. Explicitly measured attitudes are ones in which an individual is 
explicitly asked to report their attitude. An implicitly measured attitude, on the other hand, 
is one in which the attitude is gauged through automatic or unconscious responses in the 
measure. When implicit and explicit attitudes differ, these discrepancies can be interpreted 
in a few ways. It may be that the underlying structure of the explicit and implicit attitudes is 
different (i.e., they do not share an underlying structure), and thus they are not presenting 
in the same way in measurement (Fazio & Olson, 2003; Olson & Fazio, 2003). Alternatively, 
the underlying construct may be the same, but their expression may be different. In this 
case, the implicit attitude may be considered closer to the underlying construct, with the 
explicit attitude may reflect the moderation of this underlying construct by conscious and 
controlled processes (Fazio & Olson, 2003; Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & 
Schmitt, 2005). For instance, an implicit attitude may be affected by social desirability 
concerns, leading to the explicit expression of the attitude to be altered from the implicit 
attitude (e.g., a desire to appear devoutly religious to avoid being perceived as immoral). 
These implicit attitudes may be less controlled reactions from automatic associative 
activations, whereas the explicit responses are more controlled (Bodenhausen, Brannon, & 
Gawronski, 2016; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2014; Gawronski, Sherman, & Trope, 2014). 
Cautions and Limitations 
It is important when considering implicit measures to be mindful of the 
interpretation of implicit beliefs and thoughts. It can be tempting when detecting a 
difference between implicit and explicit beliefs to say that the implicit beliefs are, in some 
respect, true or more accurate to the “real” beliefs of the individual; this, however, is not 
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necessarily the case. The implicit belief may be more intuitive or automatically induced in 
the individual, while the explicit belief may be more curated and monitored, but this does 
not imply that one is “truer” or more “accurate” than the other. Despite this distinction, 
implicit thoughts are still worthy of consideration. For instance, consider the example of 
attitudes towards black men. An individual might, as a result of media exposure and 
socialization, harbor implicit fear for black men. This individual might also be aware of the 
bias and prejudices associated with being a black male, and they may actively work to 
correct these thoughts whenever they find themselves thinking them. Despite these efforts, 
they may still find themselves having kneejerk negative reactions to black men in their daily 
lives. While they may have implicit biases against black men, they are also trying to correct 
these biases. However, their biases may still negatively impact black men without them 
realizing it. Thus, both the implicit and the explicit attitudes are important to be aware of 
and consider. 
Existing Measures of Implicit Religious Belief 
Very few alternatives to explicit measures of religiosity have been developed in the 
past. Jong, Zahl, and Sharp (2017) break these measures down into two categories: “low tech” 
options and response latency-based measures. Low-tech options on implicit religion are the 
sort that don’t involve extensive technology such as is used to measure reaction times. These 
low-tech techniques vary from ones that pick up on religiosity of participants by measuring 
the beliefs attributed to God by participants (Barrett & Keil, 1996) to how much religiosity 
they read into an ambiguous scenario (Vargas, Von Hippel, & Petty, 2004). While these 
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measures are useful for indirectly assessing religious belief, they lack a level of measurable 
automaticity that “high tech” options share. 
Response latency-based measures are more common insofar as implicit 
measurements go. These techniques vary from categorization—or “property verification 
measures” (Jong et al., 2017)—to implicit association tests. Very few categorization 
techniques have been developed for religious belief, and most involve measuring just 
reaction times on the categorization of the terms (e.g., Cohen, Shariff, & Hill, 2008; Jong, 
Halberstadt, & Bluemke, 2012). The existing measures lack a sense of how those 
categorization decisions were made. A few Implicit Association Task (IAT, Greenwald, 
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) measures have also been developed for the indirect 
measurement of religious belief. 
An IAT works by having participants categorize target and attribute terms into 
paired associations. Participants are shown a word and asked to categorize it based on 
whether it is associated with one of the targets OR one of the attributed or the other target 
OR the other attribute. For instance, an IAT may have the targets of Ingroup/Outgroup and 
the attributes of Moral/Immoral. A given trial would ask them to categorize a term as being 
associated with the ingroup OR morality or the outgroup OR immorality. These pairs are 
repeated for a number of trials, then switched. Participants’ relative latency in categorizing 
the pair terms is the basis of the implicit measure (e.g., whether participants associate the 
ingroup or outgroup more with the concept of morality or immorality.) The Religiousness-
Spirituality IAT (LaBouff, Rowatt, Johnson, Thedford, & Tsang, 2010) asks participants to 
categorize terms as “self” words (e.g., “I,” “me”), “other” words (e.g., “they,” “them”), 
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“religious-spiritual” words (e.g., “faithful,” “spiritual”), or non-religious words (e.g., 
“nonspiritual,” “nonreligious”). Term categories are paired in one set of trials (e.g., self OR 
religious versus other OR nonreligious) and then reversed in a second set of trials. Their 
latency on the categorization is interpreted as their implicit religiosity-spirituality.  
One problem with IATs is in their interpretation. Due to their paired 
categorization, traditional IATs give relative latencies and lack a clear interpretation for 
their latency measures. For instance, does reacting relatively quickly to self/religious-
spiritual and other/non-religious non-spiritual trials (as compared to other/religious-
spiritual and self/non-religious non-spiritual trials) indicate that participants strongly 
identify themselves as religious, strongly identify others as non-religious, or some mix of the 
two? This is a critical distinction when interpreting the implicit religiosity of participants. 
For this reason, single target IATs have been developed (Cohen et al., 2008; Jong et al., 2012). 
These involve the same procedure as an IAT, but with only one target being assessed instead 
of two (Wigboldus, Holland, & van Knippenberg, 2004). These single IATs lack the 
interpretation issue, but still do not allow for the process of the categorizations to be 
observed. 
 
Measuring Automaticity of Belief 
While truly implicit measures of religious belief are lacking in the field and 
interpretations of “implicit religious belief” require much by way of caveats and cautions, it 
is still possible to attempt to examine the automaticity of religious beliefs without making 
interpretations beyond these judgements about what the “true” belief of the individual is. 
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Given the role of automatic responses in associative-propositional evaluations (e.g., 
Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2014), and—compared to existing implicit measures of belief—
the relative interpretability of the outcome measures, the automatic responses and 
categorizations of religious terms would be useful for exploring the relationship between 
explicit belief and automatic processes that factor into the judgements of these beliefs. 
 
Current Study 
The purpose of this study was to analyze the automatic judgments of religious belief 
by using a measure that, unlike previous measures created, was able to measure both the 
latency of the expression of these beliefs as well as the way in which they deliberated on that 
expression. To accomplish this, I used the MouseTracking task (Freeman & Ambady, 2010) 
to have participants sort terms related to religious belief as either “real” or “not real,” thus 
allowing for the measurement of both the latency of these decisions and the certainty in the 
moment in making these decisions to assess the automaticity of these judgements. 
 
 
Chapter 2: Methods 
Measures 
Implicit Measure 
The MouseTracking task is a computer based sorting task. It gives participants a 
series of images or words and asks them to sort them into one of two categories. To perform 
the categorization, the participant drags the image or word from a starting position to the 
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position of the category chosen. This task evaluates the ultimate decision of the participants 
on each item as well as estimating the automaticity of the decision as it was being made. The 
path of the decision from the start position to the end point is tracked, allowing for the 
path and speed of the decision to be examined. For an illustrated example, see Figure 3. The 
dotted line in the third frame shows a more direct (more automatic) decision than the solid 
line, which wavered more before reaching the categorization decision. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Illustration of Mouse Tracking Task. 
 
This task has been used to measure implicit attitudes on range of topics, including 
gendered stereotypes of race (K. L. Johnson, Freeman, & Pauker, 2012), attitudes towards 
people of color (M. K. Johnson, Labouff, Rowatt, Patock-Peckham, & Carlisle, 2012), social 
statues cues in race perception (Freeman, Penner, Saperstein, Scheutz, & Ambady, 2011), and 
gender and racial ambiguity (Hehman, Stolier, & Freeman, 2015). Even other implicit 
measurement tasks have also been coded into the MouseTrack framework. For example, the 
IAT has been implemented in the MouseTrack, allowing for the added benefits of the 
decision path analysis in other traditional measures (Yu, Wang, Wang, & Bastin, 2012). 
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For the purposes of the current study, words relating to religious belief will be 
categorized by participants into two categories: real and not real. The full list of the words to 
be used are given in  
 
Table 1. These words were matched for their length across categories, with seven 
words in each category, plus seven religious words.  
 
 
Table 1. Categorization words for Mouse Tracking task. 
Real Not Real Religious 
Dog Elf God 
Pilot Fairy Saint 
Spider Dragon Angel 
Doctor Wizard Devil 
Janitor Mermaid Messiah 
Teacher Unicorn Prophets 
 
 
The task works by presenting these terms individually in a random order. The 
participant is reset each trial to the starting position, ensuring that the trajectories across 
the words will be begin at the same starting point. Once the trial begins, the participant is 
shown the term for that trial and has to move the mouse over to the corner corresponding 
with their choice. Screenshots of the layout of the task are given in Figure 4.  
 
Explicit Measures 
In addition to the implicit measure of the MouseTracker, a series of self-report 
surveys were given to assess religious belief. To allow for direct comparison, the complete 
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list of terms used in the MouseTracker was given to participants in survey format. 
Participants explicitly marked each of the terms as Real, Not Real, or I don’t know. In 
addition to gauging their ratings of the terms, measures of self-reported religious 
identification were included as well as measures of religious belief and upbringing. 
Demographic data also collected. The full list of the measures included in this survey are 
given in the Appendix. 
 
 
Figure 4. Screenshots of MouseTracker as used. 
 
 
Participants 
Participants were recruited from the undergraduate SONA subject pool. The 
proposed sample size for this study was 100 participants, with the study run through the 
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remainder of the Spring semester. The sample size obtained by the date of this document 
submission was 121 participants, with data collection continuing until the end of the 
semester. See Table 2 for the full breakdown of religious beliefs in the subject pool versus 
the obtained sample. Though the self-reports from the SONA prescreen had approximately 
16.5% of participants who identified their religious beliefs as atheist, agnostic, or none, the 
obtained sample contained less than 1% (n = 3) from these labels. All three of these 
participants identified as agnostic, and two of the three also reported believing in a god or 
gods. A total of 17 participants reported not believing in a god or gods; of these 17, 14 said 
they were not currently religious. Another 13 participants reported that they were not 
currently religious, but said that they did currently believe in a god or gods. There was one 
participant who reported having been raised as an atheist, but that currently identifies as 
protestant Christian. 
 
Table 2. Self-Reported Religions of SONA Subject Pool from Spring 2018 Prescreen Survey compared 
to this sample. 
 Religion Choices Overall Sample 
Theists Christian (Baptist) 171 42 
Christian (Catholic) 179 31 
Christian (other) 191 12 
Jewish 3 0 
Muslim 5 2 
Nones Agnostic 42 3 
Atheist 27 0 
None 50 0 
Other Other 22 3 
Missing Decline to answer 29 28 
Total  719 121 
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Procedure 
Research assistants assigned numbers to the participants based on a participant log 
sheet, provided to them ahead of time. This number was entered into the Qualtrics survey 
and the MouseTrack task to allow for the participants’ data from the two tasks to be 
combined. Participants were given an informed consent form upon arrival. When consent 
was obtained, the participant was set up with the MouseTrack task. 
Before starting the main trials of the MouseTrack task, participants completed a 
tutorial with their research assistant there to guide them. After the tutorial, participants 
were left to complete the MouseTrack task by themselves. Participants completed 18 trials 
(6 Real terms, 6 Religious terms, 6 Not Real terms), all presented in a random order. For 
each trial, the participant would click on the Start at the bottom of the screen, then after 
the term appeared, click either REAL (top left) or NOT REAL (top right) at the top of the 
screen. 
After the final trial, the MouseTrack task would automatically close, leaving the 
participant back on the Qualtrics survey from the informed consent. The first part of the 
survey gave them the same list of terms from the MouseTracker task, each term presented 
on its own page and in a random order. Participants explicitly marked each of the terms as 
Real, Not Real, or I don’t know. After completing this explicit measure for the terms, they 
filled out the measures of religious belief, upbringing, and social desirability. Lastly, 
participants filled out basic demographic information.  
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Chapter 3: Results 
A total of 121 participants were recruited for this study. Of those, one participant 
was run without completing the MouseTracking task, and was as such excluded from the 
analyses of the MouseTracker data. 
Overall 
The MouseTracker task data consists of mapped trajectories from the participants’ 
mouse movements as they categorize the terms from each of the trials. Figure 5 gives the 
trajectories for every participant on the Real Terms (A), Religion Terms (B), and Not Real 
Terms (C), as well as overall mean trajectories for the three categories (D). For these 
trajectories, the paths that end in the top left corner were categorized as real while paths 
that end in the top right corner were categorized as not real. The Real and Not Real terms 
can be used as a manipulation check of sorts. On the whole, the Real Terms and Not Real 
terms were both categorized by participants as intended. Religion Terms were categorized 
predominantly as real, with some variation. Table 3 gives a breakdown for the three term 
groups by how they were categorized by participants. For a full breakdown for each term, 
see Table 4 for Religion Terms and Table 5 for Not Real Terms. Real Terms could not be 
analyzed individually in the same way due to the fact that all but three of the trials were 
categorized as real (see Table 3), and thus the MouseTracker analyzing software would throw 
an error at this level of analysis. 
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Real Terms 
A 
Religion Terms 
B 
Not Real Terms 
C 
 
 
 
 Mean Trajectories 
D 
 
 
Figure 5. Overall Trajectories for MouseTrack Task. For A, B, and C, lines represent the mouse trajectories for each term, with the 
outcome represented by the end points in the top left (REAL) and top right (NOT REAL) corners. D shows the mean trajectories across 
all participants.  
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Table 3. Overall Trajectories for MouseTrack Task 
By Participant Categorization 
Terms Mean Trajectories Real Not Real 
Real 
 
Total trials = 720 
 
Total trials = 717 
 
Total trials = 3 
Religion 
 
Total trials = 720 
 
Total trials = 576 
 
Total trials =144 
Not Real 
 
Total trials = 720 
 
Total trials = 32 
 
Total trials = 688 
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Table 4. MouseTrack Trajectories for Religion Terms 
Terms Mean Trajectories Real Not Real 
God 
 
Total trials = 120 
 
Total trials = 105 
 
Total trials = 15 
Saint 
 
Total trials = 120 
 
Total trials = 102 
 
Total trials = 18 
Angel 
 
Total trials = 120 
 
Total trials = 92 
 
Total trials = 28 
Devil 
 
Total trials = 120 
 
Total trials = 89 
 
Total trials = 31 
Prophets 
 
Total trials = 120 
 
Total trials = 91 
 
Total trials = 29 
Messiah 
 
Total trials = 120 
 
Total trials = 97 
 
Total trials = 23 
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Table 5. MouseTrack Trajectories for Not Real Terms 
Terms Mean Trajectories Real Not Real 
Elf 
 
Total trials = 120 
 
Total trials = 6 
 
Total trials = 114 
Fairy 
 
Total trials = 120 
 
Total trials = 4 
 
Total trials = 116 
Dragon 
 
Total trials = 120 
 
Total trials = 9 
 
Total trials = 111 
Wizard 
 
Total trials = 120 
 
Total trials = 4 
 
Total trials = 116 
Mermaid 
 
Total trials = 120 
 
Total trials = 5 
 
Total trials = 115 
Unicorn 
 
Total trials = 120 
 
Total trials = 4 
 
Total trials = 116 
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Analysis of Belief 
Given the religious breakdown of the participants in this sample, the planned 
comparisons between theists and atheists from the study proposal were not possible. There 
were no self-identified atheists in the sample to compare to the theists. 
 
Belief in God/Gods 
Though comparing atheists and theists was not strictly possible in this sample, there 
was a small number of participants that identified as not believing in a god or gods (n = 15). 
The breakdowns for these participants’ trajectories by term category as compared to the 
participants who said they did believe (n = 115) is given in Table 6. For the two groups, the 
Real terms and Not Real terms have very similar overall trajectories. Their ratings of 
religious terms, however, is visibly different. Table 7 gives the ratings for the term God 
compared to the rest of the Religion Terms for these two groups. The Yes group appears to 
have more uniform trajectories, especially with respect to the term God. These participants 
also appear to have more direct paths for their Religion Terms than do those in the No 
group, especially with respect to their God trajectories. 
The trajectories for the No group have more noise and complexity (i.e., wavering 
back and forth) than the trajectories in the Yes group. As with the overall group, these 
differences do not appear to extend into the Real or Not Real terms and are mostly 
confined to the Religion terms. In other words, it’s not the case that the participants who 
report not believing in a god or gods are overall less certain or straightforward in their 
 
27 
categorization of the terms. It appears that this is limited to their categorization of the 
Religion terms. This difference suggests that those who self-report as believing in a god or 
gods may have more concrete and direct categorizations of the Religion Terms as being real 
as compared to those who self-report as not believing in a god.  
 
Ratings of Term God 
In addition to the self-reported belief in a god, the participants gave explicit ratings 
of all the different terms used in the MouseTrack task. Among the 118 participants who gave 
an explicit rating for the term God, the majority (n = 100) rated the term as Real, 10 rated it 
as Not Real, and 8 said they did not know one way or the other. Though these unequal cell 
sizes also prevent proper inferential interpretation, it is possible to observe nominal trends 
in their mouse trajectories. The breakdown by group for the terms is given in Table 8. The 
pattern of trajectories for those who rated God as real versus those who rated God as not 
real is similar to the trend in the Belief comparison. Those who were unsure about the term 
God being real or not had similar trajectories overall for the Real and Unreal Terms, but 
their Religion Terms are visibly uncertain. Their Religion Term paths appear more complex 
and have more varied classifications than in the other two conditions. Given the small 
sample size, it is difficult to say for certain, but the results seem to indicate that this 
measure is picking up on their explicit measures of uncertainty about the term God. 
Table 9 gives this same ratings breakdown for the Religion Terms compared to the 
term God. For those who rated the term God as explicitly real, their trajectories for the term 
God are smoother and shorter (more direct) than the trajectories for the rest of their 
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Religion Terms. Those who rated the term God explicitly as not real had a similar trend in 
the opposite direction. All but one of the participants categorized the term God as Not Real 
in the MouseTrack task, and their trajectories for this term were smoother and more direct 
than their trajectories for the rest of the religion terms, which they also tended to categorize 
as not real. Lastly, the participants who responded to the explicit question about the term 
God by saying they didn’t know one way or the other if it was real or not real are given in the 
final row of these two tables. Though their Real and Not Real trials display the same pattern 
as the other participants, their Religion trials seem to reflect their uncertainty on the topic. 
Their trajectories are scattered and split between the outcomes for the Religion Terms, with 
the term God having an especially complex looking set of trajectories. The differences in 
these groups’ trajectories suggests that the MouseTrack trials on Religion Terms, and the 
God term in particular, are able to track the automatic judgements and uncertainty 
surrounding these beliefs. 
 
Self-Reported Agnostics 
Three of the participants in this sample reported their religious belief as being 
agnostic. One of these three also reported not believing in a god. The trajectories for these 
participants are given in Table 10. These participants have similar trajectories for the 
MouseTrack trials involving Real Terms and Not Real Terms when compared to the overall 
groups. Their ratings of Religion Terms, however, is quite different. Their trajectories 
spider around the path similarly to the participants who did not know whether to 
categorize God as real or not real. Given that the majority (2 of 3) of these participants 
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reported that they did believe in a God and rated the term explicitly as real, it is interesting 
to see their trajectories on Religion Terms appear to be more similar to the unsure group.  
 
Raised Atheist 
There was one participant who reported having been raised as an atheist, but 
identifying as a Baptist now. These results (given in Table 11) are only one data point, and 
thus should be interpreted as such, but they are interesting to consider. The means for the 
different trial groups, especially the Religion Terms, suggest that this participant was very 
uncertain with respect to the terms in the Religion list. However, the term breakdown 
shows that this uncertainty was largely contained to the Religion Terms other than God, 
which had a fairly straightforward path to get categorized as real for this participant. This 
participant’s God trial resembles the Real Term trials more than the Religion Terms trials. 
Compared to the Real Term trials, the trajectory for the term God is more rounded and less 
direct, suggesting the automatic judgement for this term’s categorization was not as 
straightforward or direct as the Real Terms. Compared to the other groups, this 
participant’s ratings of Religion Terms appear closer to those ratings of the participants 
who selected “I don’t know” on the explicit rating of the term God, but the trajectory for 
this participant’s God trial is more similar to the trajectories for the group that rated the 
term God as real. Though it is difficult to conclude much from one data point, it is an 
interesting contrast for these two other groups.  
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Attention Check 
One last breakdown to consider from these data is that of the attention check. 
Participants who failed to answer the attention check question were separated out for 
analysis. The number who failed this check was astoundingly high (n = 54, 45%). It is unclear 
why this value should be so high, especially given that this attention check happened at the 
very start of the survey and immediately following the MouseTrack task. Given that the data 
for this project would be almost halved by excluding those who failed the attention check, 
they were left in the reported analyses in this paper. However, this fact should be kept in 
mind when considering these findings. Comparisons for those who passed versus those who 
failed this check are given in Table 12. 
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Table 6. MouseTrack Trajectories for By Belief in a God/Gods 
Currently Believe 
in a God/Gods Mean Real Terms Religion Terms Not Real Terms 
Yes 
n = 115 
  
Total trials = 630 
 
Total trials = 630 
 
Total trials = 630 
No 
n = 15 
  
Total trials = 90 
 
Total trials = 90 
 
Total trials = 90 
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Table 7. MouseTrack Trajectories for By Belief in a God/Gods - God vs. Religion Terms 
Currently Believe 
in a God/Gods Mean God Religion Terms 
Yes 
n = 105 
  
Total trials = 105 
 
Total trials = 630 
 No 
n = 15 
  
Total trials = 15 
 
Total trials = 75 
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Table 8. MouseTrack Trajectories for By Belief in a God/Gods 
“God” Rating Mean Real Terms Religion Terms Not Real Terms 
Real 
n = 100 
  
Total trials = 600 
 
Total trials = 600 
 
Total trials = 600 
Not Real 
n = 10 
  
Total trials = 60 
 
Total trials = 60 
 
Total trials = 60 
I don’t know 
n = 8 
  
Total trials = 48 
 
Total trials = 48 
 
Total trials = 48 
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Table 9. MouseTrack Trajectories for By Explicit Ratings of God - God vs. Religion Terms 
“God” Rating Mean God Religion Terms 
Real 
n = 100 
  
Total trials = 100 
 
Total trials = 500 
Not Real 
n = 10 
  
Total trials = 10 
 
Total trials = 75 
I don’t know 
n = 8 
  
Total trials = 8 
 
Total trials = 40 
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Table 10. MouseTrack Trajectories for Participants that Identified as Agnostic 
 
Mean Real Terms Religion Terms Not Real Terms 
 
n = 3 
 
Total trials = 18 
 
Total trials = 18 
 
Total trials = 18 
 
Table 11. MouseTrack Trajectories for Participant Raised Atheist 
 
Mean Real Terms God Religion Terms 
 
n = 1 
 
Total trials = 6 
 
Total trials = 1 
 
Total trials = 6 
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Table 12. MouseTrack Trajectories for By Performance on Attention Check 
Attention Check Mean Real Terms Religion Terms Not Real Terms 
Passed 
n = 66 
  
Total trials = 396 
 
Total trials = 396 
 
Total trials = 396 
Failed 
n = 54 
  
Total trials = 324 
 
Total trials = 324 
 
Total trials = 324 
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Chapter 4: Discussion 
The aim of this study was to analyze the automatic judgements of religious beliefs. 
The MouseTrack task was intended to attempt to parse out the uncertainty in the 
automatic judgements on religious terms in the participants. The results were consistent 
with this. The Real Terms were overwhelmingly and directly categorized as real in all but 3 
trials. The Not Real Terms were also predominantly categorized correctly as not real, albeit 
less uniformly than the Real Terms were. The Religion Terms had more variance with 
respect to categorization and trajectories, but the majority of participants had trajectories 
consistent with categorization of the Religion Terms as being more similar to the Real 
Terms than the Not Real terms. 
The MouseTrack task also appeared to visually track the uncertainty from the 
explicit ratings of religious belief. Though the sample sizes were too small to make 
generalizable statements, it appears that the participants who expressed a lack of belief in a 
god or who expressed some uncertainty about this belief performed differently on the word 
sorting MouseTrack task than those participants who did believe. The MouseTrack task 
seemed best able to track the uncertainty in the automatic judgements the closer the explicit 
and implicit measures lined up. In other words, when the explicit measure was directly 
related to belief in a god or asked about participants’ rating of whether the term God 
referred to something Real or Not Real, the automatic judgments on the MouseTrack 
Religion Terms seemed to track more closely, especially with respect to the specific God 
term in the MouseTrack task. This is fairly unsurprising and consistent with the previous 
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literature on implicit measures and structural fit (e.g., Payne, Burkley, & Stokes, 2008).  
Though the results of this study were very interesting, there are also some important 
limitations and caveats to consider.  
 
Limitations 
Possible Order Effects 
One potential pitfall of the current design is the possibility of order effects resulting 
from the fixed order of the MouseTrack task and the explicit measures. For every 
participant included in the analyses, the MouseTrack task was completed prior to the 
explicit ratings of the terms. However, during the piloting of the study, prior to launching 
the main data collection, a number of the research assistants accidentally ran the procedure 
in reverse, having the participants run through the MouseTrack after the explicit ratings 
(and the rest of the survey, in some cases) were already collected. This raised an interesting 
question about the potential effect of the survey on the responses on the MouseTrack task, 
as well as the other way around. How might the explicit ratings be affected by the preceding 
implicit task? It is conceivable that a participant might have, in the absence of other 
priming, rated the term “God” as referring to something real, but when presented with a 
novel task in which real and not real things are being sorted, that same choice may become 
less clear cut. Without comparing the present data to data collected where the explicit task 
is not preceded by the implicit, this determination is difficult to do. Due to the technical 
difficulties encountered by the research assistants at the time (e.g., errors in the survey 
coding, errors causing the MouseTrack to quit), complete data were not collected for these 
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participants, thus this question cannot be answered in the present study. One possible 
option to investigate this effect would be to include a control group for the explicit 
measures by having a second group of participants complete the explicit ratings of the terms 
only, or before the implicit measure. Results on the implicit measure would likely be 
affected by having the participants read through the list of terms, and thus this would not 
be an advisable design for the automaticity of the belief ratings, but the comparison could 
be useful across the groups.  
Sample Limitations 
In addition to the potential order effects, the biggest and most obvious limitation of 
this study is that of the limited sample. The lack of an adequate comparison group makes 
proper interpretation of the findings of this study challenging. It is interesting to note the 
relatively high level of participants reporting that they do not believe in a god or gods, but 
then not identifying their religious beliefs as either atheist, agnostic, or none. This is 
surprising considering the relative levels of these beliefs being reported in the pre-screen at 
the start of the semester. It is possible that the participants in this study were different in 
meaningful ways from the overall population of SONA participants from this semester. By 
design, SONA creates self-selected study samples, as participants choose which studies to 
participate in. Due to the self-selection aspect of SONA, this study was posted with as little 
information as possible so as to avoid self-selection biases. The study was posted with the 
title—“Attitudes and Meaning,” which was intended to be as innocuous as possible—and 
participating information (e.g., location, duration, number of credits) only. It is always 
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possible that these factors influence who signs up for a study, though it is unclear if this had 
an effect on the current sample. 
Alternatively, it is possible that the MouseTrack task influenced participants as a 
religion prime, possibly affecting their responses on the religious identification questions in 
ways that were not present in pre-screen. This concern might be addressed at least partially 
through testing the order effects, as suggested above.  
Attention Failure 
Finally, another limitation of note that constrains these findings is the unusually 
large proportion of participants who failed the attention check. It is unclear why this large 
of a number of participants would fail a check like this, especially when the question was 
given at the very start of the survey and immediately after asking the participants to take 
care and give honest and thoughtful answers to the survey questions. Though it is difficult to 
speculate what may have driven this effect, one possible interpretation is that this question 
coming so closely after the question about honesty may have been confusing to some 
participants. It is perhaps contradicting to ask participants to give honest and thoughtful 
answers to survey questions immediately before asking them to ignore what normally would 
be the honest answer to the following question and giving instead a potentially false 
response. Alternatively, the timing of the data collection (second half of Spring semester 
and final quarter of the academic year) may have yielded a higher than usual rate of frazzled 
and fatigued students who paid less attention than would have been preferable. 
Furthermore, the specific attention check question may have been at fault, with students 
possible passing a different check. It is impossible to tell which of these, if any, is more likely 
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for any given participant that failed the attention check. As such, this high incident of 
attention failure should be kept in mind when considering the findings of this study. 
Future Directions 
Expanding on these findings would be valuable, especially with respect to the 
sampling limitations of the current study. Future efforts investigating this topic using this 
method would benefit from oversampling people with low belief and those who may be 
uncertain on belief. Having more participation from individuals who have low belief in a 
god and who actively identify as such would be a useful addition to these findings. There 
may be ways in which those who register as uncertain in the automatic task appear different 
than those who do not when it comes to how their religious beliefs are expressed explicitly 
on surveys and questionnaires, but also in their own daily lives. 
Beyond the simple issue of not having enough non-believing individuals in this 
sample, this method would be interesting to use to explore the differences in belief between 
theists, atheists, and agnostics. The current sample contained only three agnostic 
individuals. In theory, we could expect to see a difference between agnostics who believe in 
a god versus ones who do not such that both will appear less certain in their categorizations 
of religion terms, especially “God,” but those who do not believe in a god might tend to 
categorize the term more as Not Real whereas those that do believe in a god might 
categorize it more as Real. This is an interesting empirical question and one worth 
investigating further.  
Additionally, this same sort of analysis of automatic belief using individuals who 
were raised religious versus those who were not would also be interesting. I would expect 
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that those raised religious would resemble one another more on religion terms than those 
who were not, and that this factor would be more predictive of their automatic ratings than 
would be their explicit belief ratings. 
 
Coda 
Despite the limitations and caveats addressed in this section, the findings from the 
present study are still interesting and exciting. This study offers a first pass at analyzing the 
automatic judgements that go into making decisions about religious belief, especially with 
respect to analyzing the thought process behind judgements on whether the term God refers 
to something that is real or not. This study showed that the MouseTrack task has promise as 
a tool for analyzing automatic religious belief. This method and technique offer the 
possibility of analyzing this level of automatic religious belief, allowing for the underlying 
certainty of these beliefs to be examined on an indirect basis and, ultimately, for the 
continued increase in understanding of religious belief, so fundamental a part of much of 
human existence. 
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APPENDIX - Survey Measures 
 
Attention Check 
 
We care about the quality of our survey data and hope to receive the most accurate measures of your opinions, 
so it is important to us that you thoughtfully provide your best answer to each question in the survey.  
  
Do you commit to providing your thoughtful and honest answers to the questions in this survey? 
 
• I will provide my best answers 
• I will not provide my best answers 
• I can’t promise either way 
 
We appreciate your help in this research. We are interested in whether you actually take the time to read 
directions. To show that you read the instructions, please ignore the statement below about how you are 
feeling and instead check only the "none of the above" option as your answer. Thank you very much.   
 
Please check all words that describe how you are currently feeling. 
 
• Interested 
• Excited 
• Upset 
• Afraid 
• Nervous 
• Proud 
• Irritable 
• Scared 
• Enthusiastic 
• Attentive 
• Ashamed 
• None of the above 
 
 
Explicit Ratings for MouseTrack Terms  
Randomized presentation to participants. 
 
Next you will see a list of terms from the previous task. 
Please read each one and classify them as things you believe are REAL or NOT REAL. 
 
GOD 
• Real • Not Real • I don’t know 
 
ANGEL 
• Real • Not Real • I don’t know 
 
DEVIL 
• Real • Not Real • I don’t know 
 
SAINT 
• Real • Not Real • I don’t know 
 
PROPHET 
• Real • Not Real • I don’t know 
 
MESSIAH 
• Real • Not Real • I don’t know 
 
DOG 
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• Real • Not Real • I don’t know 
 
PILOT 
• Real • Not Real • I don’t know 
 
DOCTOR 
• Real • Not Real • I don’t know 
 
JANITOR 
• Real • Not Real • I don’t know 
 
SPIDER 
• Real • Not Real • I don’t know 
 
TEACHER 
• Real • Not Real • I don’t know 
 
ELF 
• Real • Not Real • I don’t know 
 
FAIRY 
• Real • Not Real • I don’t know 
 
DRAGON 
• Real • Not Real • I don’t know 
 
UNICORN 
• Real • Not Real • I don’t know 
 
WIZARD 
• Real • Not Real • I don’t know 
 
MERMAID 
• Real • Not Real • I don’t know 
 
 
Religious Belief and Activity 
 
1. How strongly do you believe in God/gods (from 0-100)? To clarify, if you are certain that God (or 
gods) does not exist, please put "0" and if you are certain that God (or gods) does exist, then put "100." 
 
2. Have you ever, at any point in your life, believed in a god or gods? 
o Yes 
o No 
 
3. Do you currently believe in a god or gods? 
o Yes 
o No 
 
4. Were you raised religious? 
o Yes 
o No 
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5. If yes, which religion? 
o Catholic   
o Evangelical or Protestant Christian 
(Baptist, Lutheran, Methodist, 
Presbyterian, Episcopalian, 
Pentecostal)   
o Jehovah's Witness   
o Mormon   
o Jewish   
o Islam/Muslim   
o Greek or Russian Orthodox   
o Hindu   
o Buddhist   
o Unitarian (Universalist)   
o Other Christian religion   
o Other non-Christian religion   
o No religion  
o Atheist  
o Agnostic   
o No listed (self-describe)  
 
6. Are you currently religious? 
o Yes 
o No 
 
7. What is your current religion? 
o Catholic   
o Evangelical or Protestant Christian 
(Baptist, Lutheran, Methodist, 
Presbyterian, Episcopalian, 
Pentecostal)   
o Jehovah's Witness   
o Mormon   
o Jewish   
o Islam/Muslim   
o Greek or Russian Orthodox   
o Hindu   
o Buddhist   
o Unitarian (Universalist)   
o Other Christian religion   
o Other non-Christian religion   
o No religion  
o Atheist  
o Agnostic   
o No listed (self-describe)  
 
8. Outside of weddings and funerals, how frequently do you attend church or other religious services? 
o Never  
o Seldom 
o A few times a month 
o Once a week  
o A few times a week 
o Once a day 
o Several times a day 
 
9. Outside of attending religious services, how often do you pray? 
o Never  
o Seldom 
o A few times a month 
o Once a week  
o A few times a week 
o Once a day 
o Several times a day 
 
Below are a list of statements related to your beliefs. Please indicate how much you agree with each of the 
following statements.  
 
1. There exists an all-powerful, all-knowing, loving God. 
o Strongly Disagree 
o Disagree 
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o Somewhat disagree 
o Neither Agree nor Disagree 
o Somewhat Agree 
o Agree 
o Strongly Agree 
 
2. There exists an evil personal spiritual being, whom we might call the Devil. 
o Strongly Disagree 
o Disagree 
o Somewhat disagree 
o Neither Agree nor Disagree 
o Somewhat Agree 
o Agree 
o Strongly Agree 
 
3. There exist good personal spiritual beings, whom we might call angels. 
o Strongly Disagree 
o Disagree 
o Somewhat disagree 
o Neither Agree nor Disagree 
o Somewhat Agree 
o Agree 
o Strongly Agree 
 
4. There exist evil, personal spiritual beings, whom we might call demons. 
o Strongly Disagree 
o Disagree 
o Somewhat disagree 
o Neither Agree nor Disagree 
o Somewhat Agree 
o Agree 
o Strongly Agree 
 
5. Human beings have immaterial, immortal souls. 
o Strongly Disagree 
o Disagree 
o Somewhat disagree 
o Neither Agree nor Disagree 
o Somewhat Agree 
o Agree 
o Strongly Agree 
 
6. There is a spiritual realm besides the physical one. 
o Strongly Disagree 
o Disagree 
o Somewhat disagree 
o Neither Agree nor Disagree 
o Somewhat Agree 
o Agree 
o Strongly Agree 
 
7. Some people will go to Heaven when they die 
o Strongly Disagree 
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o Disagree 
o Somewhat disagree 
o Neither Agree nor Disagree 
o Somewhat Agree 
o Agree 
o Strongly Agree 
 
8. Some people will go to Hell when they die 
o Strongly Disagree 
o Disagree 
o Somewhat disagree 
o Neither Agree nor Disagree 
o Somewhat Agree 
o Agree 
o Strongly Agree 
 
9. Miracles – divinely-caused events that have no natural explanation – can and do happen. 
o Strongly Disagree 
o Disagree 
o Somewhat disagree 
o Neither Agree nor Disagree 
o Somewhat Agree 
o Agree 
o Strongly Agree 
 
10. There are individuals who are messengers of God and/or can foresee the future. 
o Strongly Disagree 
o Disagree 
o Somewhat disagree 
o Neither Agree nor Disagree 
o Somewhat Agree 
o Agree 
o Strongly Agree 
 
 
Religious Upbringing  
 
The following questions ask about experiences during your upbringing that relate to religion. Specifically, the 
questions ask about your perceptions of your primary caregiver or caregivers (i.e., parents or guardians). 
 
How often did your primary caregiver(s) do the following when you were growing up  
 
1. How often did your caregiver(s) attend religious services or meetings? 
o Never 
o Sometimes 
o Often 
o Always 
 
2. How often did your caregiver(s) engage in religious volunteer or charity work?  
o Never 
o Sometimes 
o Often 
o Always 
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3. How often did your caregiver(s) attend religious services or meetings? 
o Never 
o Sometimes 
o Often 
o Always 
 
4. How often did your caregiver(s) act as good religious role models? 
o Never 
o Sometimes 
o Often 
o Always 
 
5. How often did your caregiver(s) make personal sacrifices to religion? 
o Never 
o Sometimes 
o Often 
o Always 
 
6. How often did your caregiver(s) act fairly to others because their religion taught them so? 
o Never 
o Sometimes 
o Often 
o Always 
 
7. How often did your caregiver(s) live a religiously pure life? 
o Never 
o Sometimes 
o Often 
o Always 
 
8. How often did your caregiver(s) avoid harming others because their religion taught them so? 
o Never 
o Sometimes 
o Often 
o Always 
 
 
Social Desirability  
 
Please answer the following questions about yourself as honestly as possible. 
 
1. It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged.  
o True 
o False 
 
2. I sometimes feel resentful when I don’t get my way.  
o True 
o False 
 
3. On a few occasions, I have given up doing something because I thought too little of my ability..  
o True 
o False 
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4. There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people in authority even though I knew they 
were right..  
o True 
o False 
 
5. No matter who I’m talking to, I’m always a good listener.  
o True 
o False 
 
6. There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone.  
o True 
o False 
 
7. I’m always willing to admit it when I make a mistake.  
o True 
o False 
 
8. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget.  
o True 
o False 
 
9. I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable.  
o True 
o False 
 
10. I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different from my own.  
o True 
o False 
 
11. There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of others.  
o True 
o False 
 
12. I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me  
o True 
o False 
 
13. I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone’s feelings.  
o True 
o False 
 
 
Demographics 
 
Lastly, here are some questions about yourself. 
 
1. Age: _________  
 
2. How would you describe yourself? (check all that apply) 
o American Indian or Alaska Native   
o Asian 
o Black or African  
o Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish Origin   
o Middle Eastern or North African  
o Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander 
o White 
o Self-describe: _______  
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3. I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone’s feelings.  
o Female 
o Male 
o Non-Binary 
o Self-describe: ______ 
o Prefer not to answer. 
 
4. What is your major or field of study?: _________  
 
5. Do you currently work, or study, in a STEM (science, technology, engineering, mathematics) field? 
o Yes 
o No 
 
6. With respect to your views on social issues (e.g., same-sex marriage, abortion), would you consider 
yourself more liberal or more conservative? Please select an option below: 
o Very Liberal 
o Liberal 
o Somewhat Liberal 
o Moderate 
o Somewhat Conservative 
o Conservative 
o Very Conservative 
 
7. With respect to your views on economic issues (e.g., taxes, government spending), would you consider 
yourself more liberal or more conservative? Please select an option below: 
o Very Liberal 
o Liberal 
o Somewhat Liberal 
o Moderate 
o Somewhat Conservative 
o Conservative 
o Very Conservative 
 
8. If you are registered to vote, what is your party affiliation? 
o Democrat 
o Republican 
o Independent 
o Third Party:______ 
o Not Registered to vote 
 
9. Imagine a ladder as representing where people stand in the United States. At the top of the ladder 
(rung 10) are the people who are the best off - those who have the most money, the most education, 
and the most respected jobs. At the bottom of the ladder (rung 1) are the people who are the worst off 
- those who have the least money, the least education, and the least respected jobs or no job. The 
higher up you are on this ladder, the closer you are to the people at the very top; the lower you are, 
the closer you are to the people at the very bottom. Where would you place yourself on this ladder?  
o 10 – Top of the ladder 
o 9 
o 8 
o 7 
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o 6 
o 5 
o 4 
o 3 
o 2 
o 1 – Bottom of the ladder 
o Donald Trump 
o Gary Johnson  
 
10. Did you grow up in the the United States? 
o Yes 
o No 
 
11. Which state did you grow up in?: _________  
 
12. How would you categorize where you grew up? 
o Urban 
o Suburban 
o Rural 
 
13. Which state do you live in now?: _________  
 
14. How would you categorize where you live now? 
o Urban 
o Suburban 
o Rural 
 
15. Is there anything important we missed or you wish to tell us in regards to the topics of this survey?: 
______________________________________________ 
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